Trump, Colby and the New War Hawks
If the neocons had Iraq and Saddam in their sights, the Trumpian guard have fixed theirs on China. The return of Elbridge Colby to the Pentagon marks a decisive moment in that pivot: a reorientation of US military and economic strategy away from the long hangover of the War on Terror and towards a protracted confrontation with Beijing. Colby, confirmed by a 54–45 vote in the Senate, will now be responsible for briefing Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth on all matters of defence policy. He will be the man in the room. There will be no calm head whispering in Hegseth’s ear. No cautious interagency consensus. No career diplomat steering things back to strategic ambiguity. Just Colby—combative, certain, and spoiling for a fight.
His record is not subtle. As deputy assistant secretary of defence for strategy and force development during Trump’s first term, Colby was among the earliest and loudest voices pushing for a strategic shift away from the Middle East. China, he insisted, was the threat that mattered. In his recent confirmation hearings, he dodged questions about Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, claiming the matter was too “delicate” to discuss publicly. Trump’s team called it diplomacy. The reality is cruder: Trump wants pliability on Russia and ferocity on China, and Colby delivers both. The fantasy that Hegseth, Fox News warrior, Trumpist loyalist, political battering ram, might be tempered by institutional advice is just that. With Colby at his side, the US defence establishment is now led by men who think escalation is clarity, who believe deterrence means permanent confrontation, and who want to unlearn the lessons of endless war, not to avoid repeating them, but to do them harder and better this time.
What Colby offers is ideological coherence. He doesn’t just advocate for preparedness in the Pacific; he wants Taiwan to increase its defence spending to 10 per cent of GDP, an absurd figure that treats the island not as a polity but as a proxy fortress. He sees war not only as possible but likely, and his appointment suggests the administration does too. The anti-China animus now defines US strategic priorities in a way that even Iran never did for Bush and Cheney. What mattered then was a pliable target. What matters now is a peer adversary to justify rearmament.
And Colby’s appointment doesn’t come in isolation. It is synchronised with a full-spectrum economic offensive. On 5 April, the Trump administration imposed a 10 per cent tariff on all imported goods. From 9 April, China faces a 104 per cent tariff, an act of economic warfare that effectively functions as a blockade. Trump’s loyalists are calling it “Liberation Day”. The language is telling: war metaphors, moral certainty, and the theatre of rupture. This isn’t about trade. It’s about drawing battle lines.
Markets, ever desperate to pretend politics is noise, tanked on the news, then clawed back ground as investors convinced themselves that the new tariffs wouldn’t really apply to them. But it’s clear this isn’t performative. Trump’s people, recycled loyalists, nationalist ideologues, and Silicon Valley war tourists, are serious about decoupling. That’s why Colby is back. That’s why the tariffs came without warning, consultation, or care. The plan isn’t to negotiate. It’s to coerce.
Beijing, for its part, has responded with expected fury, vowing to “fight to the end”. But the reality is that China is constrained. It cannot easily retaliate without risking further isolation. Xi’s search for allies has so far been limited to diplomatic gestures and rhetorical condemnation. Europe is hesitant. The Global South, long courted by China, is wary of being caught in the crossfire.
What remains of the liberal foreign policy establishment, such as it was, appears paralysed. A handful of Democrats still mutter about multipolarity and climate coordination, but they are increasingly marginal. The consensus has shifted. Economic nationalism, security-first diplomacy, and a siege mentality toward China now dominate both wings of the ruling class. What was once bipartisan is now post-partisan, not agreement, but alignment. It’s not about whether to confront China, but how, when, and how far to go. And with Colby at the table, the answer is: immediately to the brink.
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